THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL VS ANWAR ALI SARKAR : CASE SUMMARY
Justice Das in the State of West Bengal Vs. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 1 SCR 284 propounded twins tests of permissible classification under Article 14 which has been followed in subsequent judgments and has become locus classicus.
FACTS OF THE CASE
West Bengal State Legislature enacted the West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 to provide for speedier trial of certain offences. Section 3 of the Act empowered the State Government by notification in the official gazette to constitute special courts. Section 5 provided that a special court shall try such offences or classes of offences or cases or classes of cases, as the State Government by general or special order in writing direct. The Respondent was convicted by Special Court. The Respondent challenged the validity of the Act on the ground that it violated Article 14. Calcutta High Court quashed the conviction.
FINDINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT
The majority held that the procedure laid down by the Act for the trial by the Special Courts varied substantially from that laid down for the trial of offences generally by the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Act did not classify or lay down any basis for classification of the cases which may be directed to be tried by the Special Court, but left it to the uncontrolled discretion of the State Government to direct any case which it liked to be tried by the Special Court.
Justice Das wrote a separate judgment wherein he propounded twin tests for permissible classification under Article 14.
Justice Das observed that Article 14 of the Constitution corresponds to the last portion of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the American Constitution except that Article 14 has also adopted the English doctrine of rule of law by the addition of the words “equality before the law”.
Justice Das observed that it is now well established that while Article 14 is designed to prevent a person or class of persons from being singled out from others similarly situated for the purpose of being specially subjected to discriminating and hostile legislation, it does not insist on an “abstract symmetry” in the sense that every piece of legislation must have universal application. All persons are not, by nature, attainment or circumstances, equal and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment and therefore the protecting clause has been construed as a guarantee against discrimination amongst equals only and not as taking away from the State the power to classify persons for the purpose of legislation. The classification may be on different bases. It may be geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like. Mere classification, however, is not enough to get over the inhibition of the Article. The classification must not arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled namely – (1) that the classification must be founded on the intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and (2) that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. In short, while the Article forbids class legislation in the sense of making improper discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred or the liability proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary.
Justice Das held that Section 5 (1) of the Act in so far as it empowered the State Government to direct “offences” or “classes of offences” or “classes of cases” to be tried by a Special Court, does not confer an uncontrolled and unguided power on the State Government but by necessary implication contemplates, a proper classification and is not void. That part of the section which empowered the Government to direct “cases” as distinct from “classes of cases” to be tried by a Special Court void.
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Mukesh Kumar Suman is an advocate and legal author based at Delhi. He regularly appears before various Judicial Forums including NCLT, NCLAT, High Courts and the Supreme Court. He can be approached at mukesh_suman@outlook.com or +91 9717864570.